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Revealing Privilege—Why Bother? 
Danielle Kie Hart  
ABSTRACT 
Fifteen years ago, Stephanie Wildman wrote a provocative and 
compelling book entitled Privilege Revealed: How Invisible 
Preference Undermines America, with contributions by Margalynne 
J. Armstrong, Adrienne D. Davis, and Trina Grillo. In a thorough but 
concise examination of different and seemingly unrelated topics 
including, among others, housing, the workplace, and language, 
Wildman made visible what was and, unfortunately, remains the 
hidden but normative baseline of whiteness, maleness, and 
heterosexuality against which all “others” are judged. More than 
that, the book revealed that institutionalized but invisible systems of 
privilege define and continue to uphold the status quo. In this short 
Essay, I delineate what I perceive to be Wildman’s challenge to 
progressives to reveal privilege in the work we do. But I also 
question whether taking up Wildman’s call to arms is even worth 
doing. After all, as Derrick Bell told us, inequality is here to stay. So, 
why bother challenging it? The short, honest answer is that we 
challenge inequality because we must. I therefore take up Wildman’s 
challenge by revealing privilege in contract law in the form of class 
privilege and bargaining power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the Law and Society annual meeting was held in San 
Francisco. I was lucky enough to be invited by my friend, Lisa 
Ikemoto, to attend a lunch following a panel. All the panelists 
attended the lunch, including another friend, Stephanie Wildman. At 
one point during the lunch, Stephanie said that she still used her 
book, Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preference Undermines 
America,
1
 in her teaching, but she was seriously considering whether 
she should discontinue doing so. Stephanie specifically wondered 
about the book’s continuing relevance—or at least that is how I 
remember the conversation going. 
My memory of the specifics of the conversation at that lunch may 
be a little sketchy. But I distinctly remember being struck dumb by 
Stephanie’s comment. How could she possibly think that Privilege 
Revealed might no longer be relevant? Had she gone mad? I 
remember expressing my shock to Stephanie (though I probably kept 
my concern about her mental health to myself). 
After the lunch was over, however, I started to think about 
Stephanie’s book and the concept of “privilege” that she brought to 
light in it. I realized that I had not been focusing on privilege in my 
own work and instead focused on oppression. In fact, in talking to 
friends and colleagues and in taking a quick look at some of the anti-
subordination literature, I realized that “privilege” was not being used 
(at least not regularly) in the discourses in which my friends, 
colleagues, and I participate. So, I am especially grateful for the 
 
 1. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). 
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opportunity to participate in this symposium, which explores the 
concept of privilege and attempts to revitalize the discussion of 
privilege in its many iterations (race, gender, class, sexual 
orientation, etc.) to better understand its role in reinforcing and 
reinstantiating hierarchy.  
In Part I of this Essay, I delineate what I perceive to be Wildman’s 
challenge to progressives to reveal privilege in the work we do. Then, 
in Part II, I question whether taking up Wildman’s call to arms is 
even worth doing. After all, as Derrick Bell told us, inequality is here 
to stay. So, why bother challenging it? The short, honest answer is 
that we challenge inequality because we must. In Part III, therefore, I 
take up Wildman’s challenge by revealing privilege in contract law in 
the form of class privilege and bargaining power. 
I. REVEALING PRIVILEGE
2
 
In 1996, Stephanie Wildman (with contributions by Margalynne 
Armstrong, Adrienne D. Davis, and Trina Grillo) wrote a book called 
Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preference Undermines America.
3
 
As the title of the book indicates, Wildman calls specific attention to 
the idea of “privilege” and argues that this concept has not “found 
articulation in legal vocabulary.”4 She argues further that until 
dominant culture recognizes both the concept of privilege and the fact 
that systems of domination are premised on it, justice and fairness in 
the rule of law is simply unachievable.
5
 One of the challenges for 
those of us committed to resisting oppression, therefore, is to reveal 
privilege. 
 
 2. Much of the discussion in this part of the Essay is taken from the first chapter of 
Privilege Revealed, entitled “Making Systems of Privilege Invisible.” Wildman wrote this 
chapter with Adrienne D. Davis. I want to explicitly acknowledge Davis’s contributions and 
express my gratitude to her for her work, because this first chapter in particular had and 
continues to have a profound impact on how I see the world. For ease of reference, however, 
and as a continuation of the lunch conversation I had with Stephanie, I refer in the text only to 
Wildman. In so doing, I do not mean to diminish Davis’s contributions to the Privilege 
Revealed project. 
 3. WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4. Id. at 141. 
 5. Id. at 142. 
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According to Wildman, privilege is sometimes defined as “‘a 
special advantage, immunity, permission, right, or benefit granted to 
or enjoyed by an individual, class, or caste.’”6 Alone, however, this 
definition is inadequate. Wildman claims that privilege also includes 
several other attributes. Specifically, members of privileged groups 
possess privilege, but their privilege is invisible to them.
7
 That 
privilege is invisible because the characteristics of the members of 
the privileged group itself define our social norms. Those norms then 
become part of the “common sense” of society—that is, they simply 
describe the way things are and define what is normal in society.
8
 
Finally, because privilege is invisible and just part of the neutral and 
natural fabric of society, the holder of privilege is able to choose 
whether to object to oppression.
9
  
But privilege is not just an individual phenomenon or the simple 
by-product of group membership. It is also the result of the power 
relationship that produces it.
10
 Thus, for example, Wildman argues, 
“White privilege derives from the race power system of white 
supremacy. Male privilege and heterosexual privilege result from 
gender hierarchy.”11 Under this view, therefore, a “system of 
privilege” is one that distributes advantages to certain people based 
on a particular hierarchy.  
By calling specific attention to privilege, Wildman thus brings 
into focus two different but related things: the role of language and 
the frame from which we view the world. Language, she argues, 
plays an important role in the regeneration of privilege.
12
 We use 
language to help us understand the world around us. As such, we tend 
to classify the world by sorting things into categories, like race and 
gender.
13
  
 
 6. Id. at 13 (quoting the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1978)). 
 7. Id. at 13–14. 
 8. Id. at 14. 
 9. Id. at 16. 
 10. Id. at 17. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 9–10, 178. 
 13. Id. at 9–10. 
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Categorization ultimately creates binary oppositions, like 
white/Black, man/woman, and straight/gay, because we cannot 
understand something without comparing it to something else.
14
 Thus 
when we think of gender, for example, we usually think of 
male/female. To talk about privilege, therefore, creates the binary 
opposition of privileged/unprivileged. Indeed, the classification 
“privileged” simply cannot exist absent its antagonistic opposite 
because one side of the pairing without the other is devoid of 
meaning.
15
  
Despite the seeming neutrality of our linguistics (i.e., Black/white, 
male/female), our pairings are not neutral. Rather, the inherent logic 
of these paired oppositions is one of hierarchy—the dominant over 
the dominated
16—though this is never explicitly stated. One side of 
the pairing is more valued and rightly belongs in the social world, 
while the other side of the pairing, less valued by comparison, does 
not. Language—the very words we use—therefore masks the 
privilege and power inherent in the dominant side of these 
oppositional pairings by making our categories and pairings seem 
neutral, natural, and unobjectionable.
17
 
Hence, by challenging us to reveal privilege, Wildman is asking 
us to focus on the dominant side of the privileged/unprivileged 
pairing. This challenge is really a call to shift the frame from within 
which we both view the world and situate our work—not an 
insignificant undertaking.  
At its most basic level, a “frame” is a tool that enables people to 
make sense of the world around them.
18
 But the process of framing is 
an active one because the purpose of framing is to fashion specific 
and ultimately shared understandings of the world that not only 
legitimate the meaning(s) proffered but also the response(s) to those 
 
 14. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 3–7, 49–53 (1990). 
 15. See generally DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER—THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE 
BOURDIEU 84–88 (1998); see also Pierre Bourdieu & Richard Terdiman, The Force of Law: 
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 812 (1987). 
 16. SWARTZ, supra note 15, at 85-86. 
 17. WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 18. See Danielle Kie Hart, In a Word, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 215, 217 (2012). 
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meanings.
19
 In this way—by influencing what people think and how 
they think about it—the frames we choose to use can help shape 
reality.
20
 By challenging us to shift the frame to the privileged side of 
the privileged/unprivileged pairing, Wildman is challenging us to re-
imagine the world. 
But, practically speaking, what would shifting the frame in this 
fashion actually accomplish? To be entirely honest, I am not sure 
what the practical effects of revealing privilege will be because there 
is an endless list of “isms” to confront—racism, sexism, 
heterosexism, ableism, etc. So, the question that must be considered 
is whether we should even take up Wildman’s challenge to reveal 
privilege, which brings me to Derrick Bell. 
II. DERRICK BELL—WHY BOTHER? 
In his book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well,
21
 Derrick Bell tells a 
story about space traders that come to earth.
22
  
Briefly, the story goes like this: space traders come to earth from 
outer space and offer to give to the United States through its 
government everything needed to solve all of the major problems 
facing the country. In exchange, the United States has to agree to give 
the aliens all of its African American citizens to an uncertain future.
23
  
The space traders’ offer was debated. Business leaders, for 
example, recognized that African Americans were absolutely critical 
to maintaining social and economic stability and attempted to 
convince the American people to reject the trade.
24
 Without Blacks, 
poor, working class, and middle-class whites would no longer have 
anyone below them in society and, as a result, they might “look 
upward toward the top of the societal well and realize that they as 
 
 19. Id. at 217–19. 
 20. Id. 219–20; cf. ANDREW EDGAR & PETER SEDGWICK, CULTURAL THEORY: THE KEY 
CONCEPTS 351 (1999) (arguing that language is reality rather than a frame through which we 
perceive reality: “. . . language . . . do[es] not merely correspond to a pre-existing . . . reality. 
Rather, language is seen as constituting the reality we experience.”). 
 21. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
(1992). 
 22. Id. at 159–94. 
 23. Id. at 159–60. 
 24. Id. at 181. 
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well as the blacks below them suffered because of the gross 
disparities in opportunities and income.” But the government had a 
different view.
25
  
The question as to whether to accept the space traders’ offer was 
put to a vote. The American people ultimately and overwhelmingly 
agreed to the space traders’ terms—after those terms were amended 
to allow some African American “detainees” to remain on earth with 
drastically reduced citizenship privileges.
26
 
The story of the space traders illustrates one of the main themes in 
Bell’s work, namely, that racism is permanent.27 As long as white 
people are in power, he argued, nothing will ever change.
28
 
The story, particularly the part where business leaders explicitly 
acknowledge the stabilizing/deflecting role African Americans play 
in American society, also illustrates that they need us. For any 
dominant/dominated pairing to work, they need us. They need us to 
be divided, fearful, suspicious of each other, complacent, and even 
complicit in our own oppression. What this tells us, then, is that it is 
not in their best interest to have us be otherwise. How do we or can 
we move forward under these circumstances? 
This question leads to Frederick Douglass, the American 
abolitionist, author, and former slave. Douglass wrote more than a 
century ago that “[p]ower concedes nothing without demand. It never 
did and it never will.”29 So, how do we move forward with this 
reality? The answer, sadly, is not very easily. 
In Whiteness as Property,
30
 for example, Cheryl Harris documents 
the transformation of the concept of “whiteness” from literally just a 
description of skin color to a property right with legal and social 
 
 25. Id. at 181–82. 
 26. Id. at 192–93. 
 27. See generally Derrick Bell, Racism Is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 HOW. L.J. 79 
(1991). 
 28. Id. at 79–80. 
 29. TWO SPEECHES, BY FREDERICK DOUGLASS; ONE ON WEST INDIA EMANCIPATION, 
DELIVERED AT CANANDAIGUA, AUG. 4TH, AND THE OTHER ON THE DRED SCOTT DECISION, 
DELIVERED IN NEW YORK ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICAN 
ABOLITION SOCIETY, MAY, 1857, at 22 (C.P. Dewey, Printer, American Office 1857), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/resource/mfd.49004/#seq-1. 
 30. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993). 
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value and consequences.
31
 And in her article, Equality Trouble: 
Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law,
32
 Angela 
Harris shows that the story of race in this country has been an effort, 
at least in part, to reconcile our desire to pursue equality norms in the 
face of the white race’s desire to remain dominant.33 Both of these 
articles document the reinstantiation of hierarchies, specifically of 
whites over Blacks, consistently and over time.
34
 
Embedded in all of the discussions above but overlooked until 
now is a question: who is the “us” and the “them” being referenced? 
As Kimberle Crenshaw tells us, and Wildman echoes, there are so 
many intersections and strata within us.
35
 We can be and often are 
simultaneously oppressors and oppressed. Wildman writes, “there is 
no purely privileged or unprivileged person.”36 A rich, white woman, 
for example, is privileged by her race and class but could very well 
be oppressed by her sex. This idea of “intersectionality,” therefore, 
adds complexity and confusion to what is already a seemingly 
intractable problem.  
So, why bother with Wildman’s challenge to reveal privilege 
when this undertaking is so daunting? Before answering this 
question, I want to acknowledge the privilege inherent in it because it 
is breathtaking. Unlike so many others, including members of my 
own family, I can choose not to struggle against oppression
37
 because 
oppression is not something I have to contend with on a daily basis. It 
is not part of my lived experience. I look white and straight; I have 
never had to go hungry; I have health insurance; I am well educated; 
I hold a position of authority and power. I am basically insulated 
from many forms of oppression by my class and skin color. 
 
 31. Id. at 1715–77. 
 32. Angela Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race 
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923 (2000). 
 33. Id. at 1929. 
 34. Cheryl Harris, supra note 30 passim; Angela Harris, supra note 32 passim. 
 35. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); see also Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); 
WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 20–24. 
 36. WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 21. 
 37. Wildman argues that one attribute of privilege is the ability of the person with 
privilege to choose whether to struggle against oppression. See id. at 16–17. 
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So, why bother revealing privilege? Why not just focus on 
oppression or discrimination? In other words, what does privilege add 
to anti-subordination theory and discourse? The short answer, 
according to Wildman and Adrienne Davis, is that focusing only on 
the subordinated characteristic overlooks the other essential links in 
the power system, namely domination and the privilege that results 
from it.
38
 Davis reiterates, “‘Like a mythic multi-headed hydra, which 
will inevitably grow another head if all heads are not slain, 
discrimination cannot be ended by focusing only on . . . subordination 
and domination.’”39 To overcome oppression, therefore, privilege 
must be revealed. 
But what if oppression cannot be overcome? What if, as Derrick 
Bell has argued, inequality and racism are here to stay? What 
difference does it make to reveal privilege then? The answer to this 
question brings me back to Derrick Bell.  
Bell recounts meeting a Mrs. Biona MacDonald in 1964.
40
 Mrs. 
MacDonald was already a long-time civil rights activist when she and 
Bell met. At that time, Mrs. MacDonald was working with others in 
her community near the Mississippi Delta to ensure that a court order 
mandating desegregation would be implemented. Bell asked “where 
she found the courage to continue working for civil rights in the face 
of intimidation that included her son losing his job in town, the local 
bank trying to foreclose on her mortgage, and shots fired through her 
living room window.”41 Mrs. MacDonald replied, “‘Derrick,’ she said 
slowly, seriously, ‘I am an old woman. I lives to harass white 
folks.’”42 Bell then writes: 
 Mrs. MacDonald did not say she risked everything because 
she hoped or expected to win out over the whites who, as she 
well knew, held all the economic and political power, and the 
guns as well. Rather, she recognized that—powerless as she 
was—she had and intended to use courage and determination 
as weapons “to harass white folks.” Her fight, in itself, gave 
 
 38. Id. at 19. 
 39. Id. at 20 (quoting Adrienne D. Davis; internal citations omitted). 
 40. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 378 (1992). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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her strength and empowerment in a society that relentlessly 
attempted to wear her down. Mrs. MacDonald did not even 
hint that her harassment would topple whites’ well-entrenched 
power. Rather, her goal was defiance and its harassing effect 
was more potent precisely because she placed herself in 
confrontation with her oppressors with full knowledge of their 
power and willingness to use it. 
 Mrs. MacDonald avoided discouragement and defeat 
because at the point that she determined to resist her 
oppression, she was triumphant.
43
 
I am not an old woman, nor am I Black. So I cannot and do not 
lay claim to Mrs. MacDonald’s story or her history.44 But I can learn 
from it. 
I agree with Bell that inequality is here to stay. I do not know if 
we will make it to the Promised Land envisioned by Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.
45
 and so many others. But I do know this—like Mrs. 
MacDonald, I can be defiant. And I will use my defiance “as a 
weapon, [as] a form of self-expression regardless of any likelihood of 
success[.]” In short, and specifically because I acknowledge and 
recognize my own privilege, I choose to struggle against oppression.  
So, why bother? I bother because it is my fervent hope that by 
confronting oppression, regardless of whether oppression is ever fully 
eradicated, we progressives will actually make a difference for the 
better in the lived experiences of oppressed people. And, at the end of 
the day, I bother because I believe that challenging oppression is the 
right and just thing to do. This may not be a completely satisfactory 
answer to the question, but it is the answer that works for me. 
 
 43. Id. at 379. 
 44. In a Privilege Revealed chapter written with Trina Grillo, Wildman and Grillo discuss 
at length the harms caused by drawing analogies to race/racism, such as the appropriation of 
pain or the rejection of its existence. WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 85–102. 
 45. See Martin Luther King, Jr., I See the Promised Land, in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE 
CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM THE BLACK 
FREEDOM STRUGGLE 409–19 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Revealing Privilege—Why Bother? 141 
 
 
III. CLASS PRIVILEGE REVEALED IN CONTRACT LAW 
In this last and final part of this Essay, therefore, I take up 
Wildman’s challenge and reveal privilege in contract law. My main 
focus here is to establish that the contract law system is premised on 
class privilege. And to understand class privilege within the contract 
law system, one must understand what bargaining power is. Thus, I 
will also sketch the rough outline of an aspect of bargaining power—
what I am calling here “embodied” bargaining power—that is 
overlooked in contract law.  
The first part of my argument bears repeating—contract law is a 
system premised on class privilege.
46
 Here’s why: class is embedded 
in contract law by virtue of the fact that the level playing field is a 
myth. That is, pre-existing and unequal distributions of property (i.e., 
land, money, and other resources) are taken as a given and never 
questioned.
47
 Indeed, unequal distributions are deemed to be natural, 
apolitical rights that individuals sort out by competing in a free 
market. But the reality is quite different. Property rights are actually 
state-conferred rights
48
 that are literally premised on racial and 
gender subordination because property rights were originally limited 
to white men.
49
 The truth, therefore, is that the state did not distribute 
property rights equally from the very beginning.  
 
 46. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Cross-Purposes & Unintended Consequences: Karl 
Llewellyn, Article 2, and the Limits of Social Transformation, 12 NEV. L.J. 54 (2011).  
 47. See generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1928) 
(highlighting the role of the state in creating property rights and critiquing the consequences 
that directly flow from that role—that power is delegated by the state to owners of private 
property, which then enables such owners to compel their fellow human beings to do what the 
owners want, ultimately leading to the unequal distribution of material benefits); Robert L. 
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 603–04 (1943) 
[hereinafter Hale, Duress] (discussing and critiquing the unquestioned nature and existence of 
property ownership (land, labor, etc.) and its relationship to coercion). 
 48. See generally Cohen, supra note 47; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).  
 49. See, e.g., Cheryl Harris, supra note 30, at 1715–77 (discussing the racialized nature of 
property rights in general and documenting in detail the way in which whiteness was 
constructed as a property right from slavery through the affirmative action cases of the 1980s); 
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 
2117, 2122 (1996) (husbands acquired the rights to most of their wives’ property upon 
marriage). 
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This unequal distribution is then perpetuated and exacerbated over 
time because one’s property rights determine one’s bargaining power 
in the market,
50
 and one’s bargaining power ultimately determines 
what and how much one will be able to acquire.
51
 A vicious cycle is 
thus created because the party with more bargaining power can 
usually dictate contract terms, which means that the stronger party is 
able to reap more gains from each contract than it would with less 
bargaining power.
52
 Given that contracts formed via mutual assent 
and consideration are generally going to be enforceable,
53
 the 
stronger contracting party will also be able to retain the benefits from 
each of its contracts. Over time, and as a direct result, the stronger 
party will acquire more resources (money, property, labor, etc.), 
which thereby increase that party’s bargaining power and so on, ad 
infinitum.
54
 
So, to summarize, the contract law system is premised on class 
privilege because class is a structural feature of that system. Class 
inequality is then perpetuated or at least facilitated because of the 
way contract law addresses (or fails to address) bargaining power 
because most contracts will be enforced regardless of any bargaining 
power issues.
55
 Thus, class privilege is both obscured (i.e., made 
invisible) and protected under the rubric of bargaining power. 
Consequently, to understand class privilege within the contract law 
system, one must understand what comprises bargaining power—the 
second step in my argument. 
My working definition of bargaining power is that bargaining 
power consists of anything and everything that gives one party the 
ability to obtain a greater share of the contract surplus vis-à-vis the 
other party in a contract setting.
56
 Bargaining power, therefore, 
 
 50. Hale, Duress, supra note 47, at 627–28. 
 51. Cohen, supra note 47, at 13. 
 52. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 
41 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 66 (2011) [hereinafter Hart, Reality]. 
 53. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 
41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 198–216 (2009) [hereinafter Hart, Formation]. 
 54. Hart, Reality, supra note 52, at 66. 
 55. Id. at 59–65; Hart, Formation, supra note 53, at 204–16. 
 56. Cf. generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 139, 150–56 (2005) (an analysis of more traditional bargaining power concepts, arguing 
that current legal bargaining power doctrine fails to adequately address actual bargaining power 
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consists of many different components,
57
 including probably the most 
obvious one, a party’s economic assets—money and property. But 
there is an unfamiliar and overlooked component of bargaining 
power that I will focus on here. Specifically, embodied bargaining 
power is bargaining power that moves through and with a body. 
Consider the following: 
Home Seeking: Studies show that subprime mortgage loans—an 
integral part of the Great Recession—were predominantly made to 
younger, single, or divorced women of color living in minority 
neighborhoods.
58
 Even amongst this demographic, African American 
women were disproportionately represented.
59
 Similarly, a housing 
discrimination study sponsored by the department of U. S. Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) and conducted by the Urban Institute 
in 2000 reconfirmed what earlier HUD studies had found: African 
American and Hispanic homebuyers and renters experienced more 
housing discrimination in the real estate market than white 
homebuyers.
60
 The same study also documented housing 
discrimination in both the sales and rentals markets against Asians, 
Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans vis-à-vis their white 
 
disparities); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 
974–75 (1984) (arguing that “contract at will” is the most efficient solution in many 
employment relations, regardless of hypothetical bargaining power disparities). 
 57. Barnhizer, supra note 56, at 153–92. 
 58. See, e.g., Allen J. Fishbein & Patrick Woodall, Women Are Prime Targets For 
Subprime Lending: Women Are Disproportionately Represented In High-Cost Mortgage 
Market, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., Dec. 2006, at 6–11, 15, available at http://www.consumer 
fed.org/pdfs/WomenPrimeTargetsStudy120606.pdf (finding that women, particularly African 
American and Latino women, were more likely to receive subprime mortgages than men); 
Women In The Subprime Market, CONSUMERS UNION SWRO, Oct. 2002, at 1–4, available at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/women-sub.pdf (identifying weaknesses in Texas 
consumer protections that leave women, minorities, and elders vulnerable to predatory 
mortgage lending practices). 
 59. See Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 58; Women In The Subprime Market, supra note 
58. 
 60. See Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing Markets: National Results from Phase 1, 
Phase 2, and Phase 3 of the Housing Discrimination Study (HDS), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV. (Mar. 30, 2005), http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/hsgfin/hds.html 
(summarizing the study’s findings and linking to the actual study components); see also Julia 
Reade, Testing for Housing Discrimination: Findings from a HUD Study of Real Estate Agents, 
FED. RES. BANK OF BOS. CMTYS. & BANKING, Spring 2003, at 10, available at http://www.bos 
.frb.org/commdev/c&b/2003/spring/testing.pdf. 
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counterparts.
61
 Another more recent study containing over 400,000 
observations finds that African American households “pay on 
average 3 percent more for [rental] housing than their white 
counterparts.”62 Finally, a 2005 HUD study conducted by the Urban 
Institute measured discrimination in the rental market against persons 
with disabilities and concluded that people with disabilities suffered 
significant levels of adverse treatment compared to home-seekers 
without disabilities.
63
 In fact, the study found that adverse treatment 
of people with disabilities occurred even more frequently than 
adverse treatment of African American or Hispanic renters in the 
same housing market. 
Car Buying: Professor Ian Ayres conducted a well-known study 
of car dealerships in Chicago to determine whether race and gender 
discrimination were present in new car negotiations.
64
 He found that 
white males were offered better prices on new cars than African 
Americans and women. More specifically, white women testers had 
to pay 40 percent higher mark-ups than white men, Black men had to 
pay two times the mark-up, and Black women had to pay more than 
three times the mark-up of white men.
65
 A subsequent study by Ayres 
confirmed the finding that car dealers routinely offered lower prices 
to white men and offered all Black testers significantly higher prices 
than white males.
66
 But, unlike the original study, the subsequent 
study found that Black males were charged higher prices than Black 
females.
67
  
Job Seeking: There is a stark gender disparity within academic 
science. A recent study conducted by scientists at Yale attempted to 
 
 61. See Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing Markets, supra note 60. 
 62. Dirk W. Early et al., Do Blacks Pay More for Identical Rental Housing and Do Whites 
Pay a Premium to Live in Predominantly White Areas? Evidence from HUD’s Housing 
Voucher Program (paper presented at the Am. Real Estate & Urban Econ. Ass’n Meeting in 
Denver, Colo., Jan. 6–9, 2011, on file with author). 
 63. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., URB. INST., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: BARRIERS AT EVERY STEP (2005), available at http://www.hud 
.gov/offices/fheo/library/dss-download.pdf. 
 64. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991). 
 65. Id. at 819. 
 66. Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and 
Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1995). 
 67. Id. 
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explain this disparity by examining the hiring practices of established 
scientists at some of the top research universities in the country.
68
 
The study found that established scientists, both male and female, 
unconsciously rated female scientists lower than similarly 
credentialed male scientists. Established scientists also assumed that 
women in scientific disciplines were less competent, less employable, 
and less deserving of mentoring. On average, proposed starting 
salaries were 14 percent higher for male applicants than female 
applicants.
69
 
Each of the studies discussed above obviously tracks the presence 
of discrimination based on race, gender, and/or disability in different 
settings, clearly raising issues of civil rights.
70
 But each of these 
settings also has a contractual element—they involve contract 
negotiations to buy or rent a home, to purchase a new car, or to obtain 
employment.  
So, what is it about these bodies in these studies that result in 
better deals for whites in general, and white men in particular, and 
worse deals for women, people of color, and disabled people? Think 
apartment hunting for a white, able-bodied man with no apparent 
disability versus apartment hunting for a disabled, African American 
woman. Is it enough to talk about what is going on in these 
contracting situations in terms of discrimination or prejudice? I am 
not eschewing anti-subordination arguments, but I want to explore 
this contract question from within the contract law system itself.  
Hence, my argument is that there is a type of bargaining power 
that is literally inscribed on our bodies. And this type of bargaining 
power matters—it must be accounted for, explored, explained, and 
theorized—because, for reasons already discussed, bargaining power 
matters in contract law. For example, is the concept of embodied 
bargaining power that I am describing different from Michel 
 
 68. Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male 
Students, 109 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM. 16474, 16479 (2012), 
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/109/41/16474.full.pdf+html. 
 69. Id. at 16475 (“The mean starting salary offered the female student, $26,507.94, was 
significantly lower than that of $30,238.10 to the male student.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000h (1991); 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1990). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 42:131 
 
 
Foucault’s,71 Judith Butler’s,72 Robert Post’s,73 or Harlan Hahn’s74 
conceptualizations of the body—and if so, how? In other words, does 
the concept of embodied bargaining power add anything to the 
theoretical discussions that have already taken place about the social 
construction of the body? Assuming the concept does add something 
new or at least different, what, if anything, can contract law do about 
embodied bargaining power when embodied bargaining power is 
invisible to contract law?
75
 
Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this Essay. 
But at least one of them (the last one) brings things full circle. 
Privilege and inequality exist, even in that ostensible bastion of 
private law known as contract law, and embodied bargaining power 
serves as part of the link in the contract law context that enables us to 
understand the relationship between privilege and oppression. To 
begin to address privilege and the hierarchy it inevitably masks, 
Wildman tells us, we must reveal it.
76
 This Essay is therefore a first, 
small step in that direction.  
 
 71. Foucault argued the body itself is a state-created social construct by virtue of the fact 
that “sex” was a regulatory ideal that functioned not just as a norm, but also as a regulatory 
practice that produced the very bodies it governed. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, AN INTRODUCTION (1990).  
 72. Butler argues that subjects are formed through performance. Therefore, understanding 
how and why bodies are constructed is critical to her theory. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, 
BODIES THAT MATTER (1993).  
 73. Post explores the concept of “lookism” in the context of American antidiscrimination 
laws. See generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000). Post argues that, under a sociological 
approach, antidiscrimination laws transform “preexisting social practices, such as race or 
gender, by reconstructing the social identities of persons.” Id. at 31. 
 74. Within disability studies, disability is understood to be socially constructed, meaning 
that people’s perceptions of bodily difference create “disabling” conditions that really reflect 
the interaction of bodies and society’s response to those bodies. See generally, e.g., Harlan 
Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22 SOC. SCI. J. 87 
(1985); Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority 
Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 41, 45 (1996); Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in 
DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 13 (Anita Silvers et al. eds., 1998). 
 75. I plan to take up these questions in a forthcoming article entitled “Bio-Capital.” 
 76. WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 24. 
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CONCLUSION 
So, where do we go from here? Next steps are often difficult to 
imagine. I, for one, have already included parts of Stephanie’s book 
in the reading materials for my seminar. But more than that, this 
project to re-examine privilege has given me another tool with which 
to not only interrogate the workings of the contract law system but 
also to reveal the role that contract law plays in helping to create and 
perpetuate inequality in American society. Though this realist 
perspective of contract law is by no means established, the next step 
is to re-imagine contract law in ways that will reduce contract law’s 
complicity in reproducing and magnifying privilege. But if nothing 
else comes of this symposium, I really hope Stephanie decides to 
continue teaching from Privilege Revealed. Her lamentation at a 
lunch, after all, is what prompted this entire project. 
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